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The Changing Face of Broadcaster Responsibility
Under the Public Interest Standard
INTRODUCTION

During the last twenty years, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has injected more substance into the "public convenience, interest or necessity" standard of the Federal Communications Act of 1934.' Because of the FCC's increased involvement with
public interest, the duties of broadcast licensees have expanded.
This expansion is evidenced by the FCC's adoption of the personal
attack rule2 and the political editorializing rule, 3 the extension of the
fairness doctrine 4 to paid announcements,' the adoption of the
quasi-equal opportunities corollary,' the prime time access rule,7
and the family viewing policy.8 These federally-imposed responsibilities enhance the possibility of governmental infringement of broadcaster free speech. This article presents an overview of broadcaster
responsibility under the public interest standard while examining
the tension between the broadcaster's First Amendment rights and
the FCC's authority flowing from the implementation of that standard.
PUBLIC INTEREST STANDARD

The FCC is empowered to oversee all broadcasting activities to
ensure that the rights of the public are safeguarded.' This emphasis
on the public interest began under the Radio Act of 1927,10 which
compelled the Radio Commission to consider the scope, character
1. Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 303 et seq. (1962).
2. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123(a), (b), 73.300(a), (b), 73.598(a), (b), 73.679(a), (b) (1977); see note
45 infra and accompanying text.
3. 47 C.F.R. § 73.123(c), 73.300(c), 73.679(c), 76.209(d) (1977); see note 55 infra and
accompanying text.
4. FCC Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949)
[hereinafter cited as FCC Editorializing Report].
5. Friends of the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Retail Store Employee
Union, Local 880 R.I.C.A. v. FCC, 436 F.2d 248 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d
1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Tobacco Institute v. FCC, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
6. Nicholas Zapple, 23 F.C.C.2d 707 (1970).
7. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k) (1977); see note 126 infra and accompanying text.
8. See FCC Report on the Broadcast of Violent, Indecent and Obscene Material, 51
F.C.C.2d 418 (1975) [hereinafter cited as FCC Violence and Obscenity Report]; National
Ass'n. of Broadcasters Television Code, Art. I, para. 8 (19th ed. 1976).
9. 47 U.S.C. §§ 303(a), 307(a), 309(a) (1962) refer to the FCC's standard of "public
convenience, interest or necessity" which it must uphold.
10. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1166 (1927) (current version at 47 U.S.C. §§ 303
et seq. (1962)).
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and quality of services offered by a licensee to the public." The FCC
has expanded the public interest content of its licensing criteria to
include such additional elements as the "ability of the licensee to
render the best practicable service to the community reached by his
broadcasts" and the "maximum diffusion of control of the media of
mass communications."' 2 These general factors are weighed by the
FCC in assessing a broadcaster's performance under the public interest standard.
The FCC requires all broadcasters to be licensed to effectuate its
control over their activities in the limited broadcast spectrum. 3
This federal licensing system was found to be essential to the orderly
development of broadcasting in National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States.14 Twenty-six years later, the Supreme Court, in Red
Lion BroadcastingCo. v. FCC, concluded that licensing was necessary for the maintenance of the public's freedom of expression. 5 The
Court also considered licensing essential to assure that broadcasters
function consistently with the purposes of the First Amendment
since the rights of viewers and listeners are paramount to those of
broadcasters."
It is well established that a broadcaster has no ownership interest
in its segment of the broadcast spectrum. 7 The FCC merely grants
a broadcaster a license for the use of the airwaves. Because the
licensee possesses only a temporary privilege to use these airwaves,
it is, in effect, a trustee with fiduciary responsibilities to the public." As a trustee of the public airwaves, the licensee has a nondelegable duty to serve the public's interest." Of course, the broadcaster's fiduciary responsibility is not that of a typical trustee since
the broadcaster operates in the public interest as well as for its own
economic benefit. This responsibility requires the broadcast licensee
11. Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 285
(1933).
12. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940). In comparative hearings
to determine the award of a new license, the FCC considers other factors involving the public
interest: full-time participation in station operation by owners, proposed program service,
past broadcast record of owners, efficient use of frequency and the applicant's character. FCC
1965 Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393 (1965).
13. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1962).
14. 319 U.S. 190, 227 (1943).
15. 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 394; 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1962).
18. 395 U.S. at 389; McIntire v. William Penn Broadcasting Co. of Philadelphia, 151 F.2d
597 (3rd Cir. 1945).
19. W. JONES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ELECTRONIC MASS MEDIA 265 (1976) quoting
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to discover and meet the needs of its broadcast area."0 Only then can
the broadcaster serve the public's interest. 1
FIRST AMENDMENT CONCERN

Although the broadcast licensee has a duty to the public to broadcast in its interest, the licensee still has a First Amendment right
to free speech.Y The possibility of infringement of free speech always exists when the government regulates an area involving this
right. Because freedom of speech is a fundamental right, 23 any federal curtailment will be strictly scrutinized." The governmental interest and the reasons therefor will be weighed against the First
Amendment interest of the burdened party25 and the availability of

less onerous alternatives.26 The interests of the broadcaster and the
FCC often clash when the FCC acts in the public interest. In articulating the public interest standard, the FCC has developed doctrines governing particular aspects of broadcaster activity. One of
the most significant of these aspects is the fairness doctrine.
20. FCC Report and Statement of Policy Res: Commission En Banc Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303, 2314 (1960) [hereinafter cited as FCC 1960 En Banc Report]. The
major factors set forth by the FCC for meeting the public interest are:
(1) opportunity for local self-expression,
(2) the development and use of local talent,
(3) programs for children,
(4) religious programs,
(5) educational programs,
(6) public affairs programs,
(7) editorialization by licensees,
(8) political broadcasts,
(9) agricultural programs,
(1) [sic] news programs,
(11) weather and market reports,
(12) sports programs,
(13) service to minority groups,
(14) entertainment programs.
44 F.C.C. at 2314.
21. At a minimum, the task of public service requires that the licensee know the content
of its programs. Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594, 600 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 914 (1973).
22. American Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 374, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1953),
aff'd., FCC v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 347 U.S. 284 (1954).
23. See note 4 to Justice Stone's opinion in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152 (1938) which articulates reasons for greater scrutiny of legislation restraining
the freedom of speech. See also Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949); United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948).
24. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 46 U.S.L.W. 4389, 4392-93 (1978); Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 94-96 (1977).
25. 431 U.S. at 95-97; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 96 (1940).
26. 431 U.S. at 93; Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976).
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FAIRNESS DOCTRINE

One of the first principles formulated by the FCC under the public interest standard was the fairness doctrine.Y The FCC defines
this doctrine as a two-fold duty: (1) covering public issues of importance to the community served; and (2) presenting opposing viewpoints on such issues in a fair and accurate manner. 8 The use of
federal authority to compel licensees to broadcast public issues can
be viewed as an abridgment of their First Amendment rights to free
speech.
A licensee's discretion in programming is a function of editorial
judgment which is protected by the First Amendment." However,
a fundamental purpose of the First Amendment is to promote
"uninhibited, robust and wide-open" debate on public issues, 3 preserving and promoting the informed public opinion, necessary for
the continued vitality of our democratic society and institutions.,'
The public's right to have broadcasters function consistently with
these First Amendment goals is well-recognized.32 Since the FCC is
the guardian of the public interest, it is obligated to require broadcasters to provide adequate coverage of public issues.
Essentially, the fairness doctrine was adopted by the FCC to ensure preservation of the public's rights by broadcasters. This doctrine, which has the approval of both the Supreme Court and Congress, 33 applies whenever a viewpoint on an important controversial
27. FCC Editorializing Report, supra note 4 at 1250. This doctrine recognized the contribution radio could make in developing informed public opinion. According to the Radio
Commission, the public interest required "ample play for the free and fair competition of
opposing views . . . [concerning] . . . issues of importance to the public." Great Lakes
Broadcasting Co., 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32, 33 (1929), rev'd on other grounds, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C.
Cir. 1930), cert. dismissed, 281 U.S. 706 (1930).
The doctrine was applied to license renewals and construction permits under the Radio Act
of 1927. Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 62 F.2d 850(1932), cert.
denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933). At that time, the licensee was under a duty to present the views
of others, and to present them fairly, as well as to refrain from expressing its own personal
views. Mayflower Broadcasting Co., 8 F.C.C. 333 (1940). The latter requirement has since
been deleted under the modern interpretation of the fairness doctrine. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 111 (1973).
28. FCC, In the Matter of the Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and
the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 7 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as FCC Fairness Report].
29. FCC Editorializing Report, supra note 4 at 1258.
30. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
31. FCC Fairness Report, supra note 28 at 5.
32. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
33. Id. at 385. The Red Lion Court found that the adoption of the fairness doctrine was a
legitimate exercise of FCC statutory authority. Congress approved the doctrine when it incorporated it into section 315 of the Communications Act, the "equal time for political candidates" provision. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1978 Supp.).
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issue is presented in an obvious and meaningful fashion.3 ' The
broadcast licensee must then afford a reasonable opportunity for
opponents to express their viewpoints, even if that opportunity
means providing free broadcast time. 5
Under the fairness doctrine, a broadcaster has broad discretion in
the selection, programming and identification of important issues, 3
subject only to FCC review for good faith and reasonableness." The
FCC views strict compliance with the fairness doctrine as necessary
for broadcasting in the public interest.3 8 However, the FCC must
maintain a balance between the "preservation of a free competitive
broadcast system . . . and the reasonable restriction of that freedom inherent in the public interest standard. . ... ,1 Besides the

inherent limitation on regulating in the "public interest", the
express prohibition in section 326 of the Communications Act precludes the FCC from exercising any censorship of the airwaves.' 0
The FCC is in a difficult position since it must refrain from encroaching on broadcaster free speech and yet must regulate the
airwaves to prevent pandemonium and promote an "uninhibited
34. FCC Fairness Report, supra note 28 at 13. As a practical matter, most fairness complaints concern violations of the second duty requiring licensees to broadcast opposing views
on important controversial issues. In re Complaint of Public Communications, Inc., against
ABC, et al., 50 F.C.C.2d 395, 397 (1974). As to the first duty requiring the broadcast of
important public issues, only one complaint charging its violation has been sustained because
the FCC is unwilling to become involved in the subjective selection of public issues for
broadcast. In re Complaint of Patsy Mink, 59 F.C.C.2d 987 (1976).
The practical requirements of this doctrine include identifying major viewpoints (FCC
Fairness Report, supra note 28 at 15), obtaining partisans of opposing viewpoints (Id.), and
determining the percentage of the broadcast day to devote to the discussion of public issues
(FCC Editorializing Report, supra note 4 at 1247).
35. FCC Fairness Report, supra note 28 at 13-14. Several methods of implementing this
doctrine are (1) communication to a group that the broadcaster knows or has reason to know
holds a contrasting viewpoint and an offer of the use of his facilities, along with a summary
of the original broadcast; (2) consultation with community leaders; or (3) announcements at
the beginning or ending of programs that an opportunity will be made available for the
expression of opposing viewpoints from responsible individuals.
The obligation to provide free broadcast time after the presentation of one side of a controversial issue is set forth in Cullman Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 576, 577 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as the Cullman Doctrine].
36. FCC Editorializing Report, supra note 4 at 1247.
37. FCC Fairness Report, supra note 28 at 13.
38. Committee for the Fair Broadcasting of Controversial Issues, 25 F.C.C.2d 283, 292
(1970).
39. FCC 1960 En Banc Report, supra note 20 at 2309.
40. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1962) provides that:
Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the Commission
the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by
any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by
the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio
communication.
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marketplace" of ideas.41 As the ultimate arbiter of the public interest, the FCC walks a "tightrope" between preserving the First
Amendment interests of the public and upholding the editorial independence of the licensee.42
The FCC's adoption of several specific rules applying the fairness
doctrine has intensified conflict between the broadcasters who desire complete independence in their programming discretion and
the FCC which seeks adequate control to protect the public. Apart
from the infringement of broadcaster discretion, these rules do provide definite guidelines by which licensees may gauge the acceptability of their programming. The first of these rules are the personal
attack rule, 3 and the political editorializing rule."
PERSONAL ATTACK RULE AND POLITICAL EDITORIALIZING RULE

The personal attack rule provides that when an attack on the
honesty, character or integrity of a person is made during the presentation of an important, controversial issue, the broadcaster must
transmit within one week to the attacked person a transcript of the
attack, the date and time of its broadcast, and an offer to respond
on the broadcaster's facilities."5 This rule codifies the existing FCC
policy of encouraging controversial programs and providing transcripts to attacked persons." Because the FCC promulgated this
41. 395 U.S. 367, 375-76 (1969).
42. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117
(1973).
43. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123(a),(b), 73.300(a),(b), 73.598(a),(b), 73.679(a),(b) (1977) represent
the same regulations for AM radio, FM radio, noncommercial educational FM radio, and
origination cablecasting over cable TV systems, respectively.
44. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123(c), 73.300(c), 73.679(c), 76.209(d) (1977) represent the same regulations for AM radio, FM radio, TV stations, and origination cablecasting over cable TV
systems, respectively.
45. (a) When, during the presentation of views on a controversial issue of public
importance, an attack is made upon the honesty, character, integrity or like personal qualities of an identified person or group, the licensee shall, within a reasonable time and in no event later than 1 week after the attack, transmit to the person
or group attacked (1) notification of the date, time and identification of the broadcast; (2) a script or tape (or an accurate summary if a script or tape is not available)
of the attack; and (3) an offer of a reasonable opportunity to respond over the
licensee's facilities. (b) The provision of paragraph (a) of this section shall not be
applicable (1) to attacks on foreign groups or foreign public figures; (2) to personal
attacks which are made by legally qualified candidates, their authorized spokesmen, or those associated with the candidates in the campaign; and (3) to bona fide
newscasts, bona fide news interviews, and on-the-spot coverage of a bona fide news
event (including commentary or analysis contained in the foregoing programs, but
the provisions of paragraph (a) of this section shall be applicable to editorials of
the licensee).
47 C.F.R. § 73.123(a),(b) (1977).
46. Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of
Public Importance, 29 Fed. Reg. 10410, 10420-21 (1964). The FCC stated therein that licen-
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rule under its rule-making authority,47 violations will subject broadcasters to monetary penalties,4" as well as administrative sanctions.49
Broadcasters are now required to allow rebuttal time to the attacked person. Heretofore, broadcasters had used their discretion in
providing opportunities for response to personal attacks even
though the FCC had outlined this responsibility in an earlier case. °
The interest of the public in the availability of rebuttal time for its
attacked members is obvious. This rule does not cover attacks by
political candidates5 because they are protected by the equal time
provision52 and the fairness doctrine.5 3 Only a slight burden is imposed upon broadcasters who, as fiduciaries, have an overall duty
of serving in the public interest. The infringement on broadcaster
free speech is minimal since the FCC is only regulating access time
to attacked persons after the broadcaster has unqualifiedly exercised its programming discretion. While there is little conflict in this
particular area, this rule serves as the foundation for confrontation
over other duties.
sees should forward a copy of the transcript to the attacked person but licenses were usually
renewed after the licensees promised to send the transcript and not to err in the future. See,
e.g., Springfield Television Broadcasting Corp., 4 R.R.2d 631, 685 (1965); In Clayton W.
Mapoles, 23 R.R. 586, 591 (1962); Billings Broadcasting Co., 23 R.R. 951, 953 (1962); TimesMirror Broadcasting Co., 24 R.R. 404, 406 (1962).
47. 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (1962). Since agency adjudications normally bind only the immediate parties, the FCC probably decided to issue regulations through the Notice of Rule-Making
and Comment process so that its rules and regulations would apply to all persons within their
ambit. National Labor Relations Board v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764-66 (1969).
Also, the 1979 amendment to section 503 added violations of FCC "order[s]" to those
violations which subject violators to forfeiture penalties. 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B) (1978
Supp.).
48. 47 U.S.C. §§ 502, 503(b)(1)(B) (1962 and 1978 Supp.). Under the ruling in In Re
Complaints by Federation of Citizens Association of the District of Columbia 'and by Allen
C. Phelps, 21 F.C.C.2d 12, 13 (1969), no specific action is required of the licensee until prima
facie evidence of a violation is presented to the FCC by a complainant. Then the licensee
must answer an FCC inquiry on the matter. If the FCC is dissatisfied with the licensee's
answer, it will issue a Notice of Apparent Liability.
49. 47 U.S.C. § 312 (1962). Forfeitures are usually imposed when there are wilful or
repeated violations. United States v. Daniels, 418 F. Supp. 1074 (D.C.S.D. 1976); United
States v. Midwest Radio Television, Inc., 249 F. Supp. 936 (D.C. Minn. 1966).
50. Times-Mirror Broadcasting Co., 24 R.R. 404, 405 (1962) set forth FCC policy regarding
personal attacks. See, e.g., Springfield Television Broadcasting Corp., 4 R.R.2d 681 (1965);
In Clayton W. Mapoles, 23 R.R. 586 (1962); Billings Broadcasting Co., 23 R.R. 951 (1962),
where the broadcasters violated the FCC's Times-Mirror ruling regarding personal attacks.
None of the licensees lost their license or even suffered a severe consequence. Both the
personal attack rule and the political editorializing rule were promulgated by the FCC to
make the Times-Mirror ruling more enforceable. 31 Fed. Reg. 5710, 5710-11 (1966).
51. 47 C.F.R. § 73.123(b)(2) (1977). The other exceptions are set forth in (b)(1) and (b)(3).
52. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1978 Supp.).
53. Id. at (a). See also the Note to 47 C.F.R. § 73.679(b) (1977).
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Another specific duty under the fairness doctrine which limits the
licensee's programming freedom is the political editorializing rule."
Under this rule, a licensee broadcasting a political editorial must
provide opposing candidates with a transcript or tape of the editorial, the date and time of its broadcast, and an offer of time for
the candidates or their spokesmen to respond.55 If the editorials are
to be broadcast within 72 hours of an election, then the broadcaster
must comply with these provisions far enough in advance of the
election to allow the other candidates a reasonable opportunity to
respond.5 1 A broadcaster must air endorsements of opposing candidates after it has declared its preference for a legally qualified candidate.
This rule and the personal attack rule were upheld by the Supreme Court as authorized administrative regulations, 57 not violative of a broadcaster's freedom of speech. 8 The Supreme Court
stated that the First Amendment did not grant broadcasters the
right to prevent others from broadcasting on their facilities or the
right to monopolize a scarce resource. 5 This regulation prevents a
broadcaster from airing only its own views or making broadcast time
available to the highest bidders. It emphasizes that private censorship, as well as governmental, is not countenanced by the First
Amendment.
The governmental interest in an informed public requires that
responses to personal attacks be allowed and that political opponents of endorsed candidates be given a chance to communicate
with the public. This affirmative action by the broadcaster is necessary to comply with the fairness doctrine and hence with the public
interest standard. These rules reflect a desire to assure that the
54.
55.

47 C.F.R. §§73.123(c), 73.300(c), 73.679(c), 76.209(d) (1977).
(c) Where a licensee, in an editorial, (i) endorses or (ii) opposes a legally
qualified candidate or candidates, the licensee shall, within 24 hours after the
editorial, transmit to respectively (i) the other qualified candidate or candidates
for the same office or (ii) the candidate opposed in the editorial (1) notification of
the date and the time of the editorial; (2) a script or tape of the editorial; and (3)
an offer of a reasonable opportunity for a candidate or a spokesman of the candidate
to respond over the licensee's facilities: provided, however, That where such editorials are broadcast within 72 hours prior to the day of the election, the licensee shall
comply with the provisions of this paragraph sufficiently far in advance of the
broadcast to enable the candidate or candidates to have a reasonable opportunity
to prepare a response and to present it in a timely fashion.
47 C.F.R. § 73.123(c) (1977).
56. Id. at the proviso.
57. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 385 (1969).
58. Id. at 396.
59. Id. at 389.
60. Id. at 390.
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public perspective is balanced where possible. They impose only a
slight burden on broadcaster discretion. Since neither rule prevents
a licensee from broadcasting what it deems in the public interest,
there is no direct abridgment of a licensee's free speech. Any indirect infringement can be seen as an incidental effect of FCC regulation of the broadcasting function."A
Commercial Speech
The fairness doctrine has been extended by the FCC to paid announcements which "obviously and meaningfully" present important public issues. 2 The distinction between the broadcaster as a
political observer and commentator13 and the broadcaster as a
guardian of the public forum64 is most pronounced in the area of
advertising. The broadcaster must raise revenues in order to preserve this forum for the public's exercise of its First Amendment
rights as well as to maintain a profitable operation. Commercial
speech has been accorded First Amendment protection 5 but it has
not been held to be "wholly undifferentiable" from other forms of
speech." Regulation, and hence infringement, may be permitted to
a greater degree with this type of speech than with the more traditional types. 7 Greater broadcaster restrictions may be permissible
so that the public will be protected from false, misleading and deceptive advertising. Since verification of the truth of advertisements
is easier than verification of the truth in news reporting or political
commentaries," minor inaccuracies may not be tolerated because of
minimal concern with chilling commercial speech.69
61. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682-83 (1972) where the Court maintained that
incidental burdens imposed on the press are not violative of the First Amendment. Publishers
have no special immunities from the application of laws nor special privileges to invade the
rights of others. Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937). Similarly, broadcasters incidentally burdened under FCC regulation have no greater First Amendment rights than
the press.
62. FCC Fairness Report, supra note 28 at 23.
63. FCC Editorializing Report, supra note 4 at 1258; Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117-18 (1973).
64. FCC Editorializing Report, supra note 4 at 1258; see note 15 infra; 412 U.S. at 11.7.
65. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 46 U.S.L.W. 4371, 4376 (1978); Bates v. State
Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 363-64 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761-65 (1976).
66. 425 U.S. at 771, n.24. Accord, Mr. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion, supra, at 779,
where he points out that the "differences between commercial price and product advertising
• . . and idealogical communication" permit regulation of the former under the First Amendment but not of the latter. See also Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 6869 (1976).
67. Id. at 771-72.
68. Id. at 772.
69. Compare New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) with Virginia State
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A further distinction can be made in this area between editorial
and commercial advertising. In editorial advertising, which includes
political advertising, the broadcaster is acting within its journalistic
role as observer and commentator when it is providing a balanced
coverage of important public issues?0 In commercial advertising,
the broadcaster is acting as guardian of the public forum since it is
promoting the free flow of commercial information," while procurring those funds necessary to support its public interest programming. In order to comply with the fairness doctrine, the broadcaster
must monitor three categories of advertisements: editorial, political
and commercial.
EDITORIAL ADVERTISEMENTS

Editorial advertisements have been defined as commentaries on
significant public issues or editorials paid by a sponsor." The FCC
maintains that in those cases where the sponsor seeks to play an
"obvious and meaningful" role in public debate the fairness doctrine should apply.73 Institutional advertising, designed to enhance
the public image of a sponsor, does not involve public debate and
therefore is not subject to the fairness obligation.'
The FCC standard for licensees in this area is an objective one:
whether the advertisement presents a meaningful statement which
"obviously addresses, and advocates a point of view on, a controversial issue of public importance." 7 5 The licensee's duty concerning
editorial advertisements consists of a review of the text of the advertisement, general knowledge of the controversial issues and arguments, and assessment of the probable impact on public debate."
This duty may also include providing free air time when paid sponsorship of opposing viewpoints is unavailable." If the relationship
between the advertisement and the debate is too tenuous, the fairness doctrine will not apply.7
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
70. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 118
(1973).
71. 425 U.S. at 765.
72. FCC Fairness Report, supra note 28 at 22.
73. Id. at 23.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. In Cullman Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 576 (1963), the FCC first articulated the
broadcaster's duty of providing free air time when paid sponsorship of a contrary viewpoint
was unavailable.
78. National Organization for Women v. FCC, 555 F.2d 1002, 1011-13 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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When the broadcaster is functioning as a political observer and
commentator, the potential for direct conflict with the FCC necessitates meticulous appraisal of all regulation. Since this type of
speech is protected by the First Amendment,79 FCC regulation must
be circumspect and justified by a significant governmental interest. 0 The FCC seeks to ensure the presentation of both sides of an
important issue. The fairness doctrine allows the realization of this
goal. Content is not being programmed; only the opportunity to
communicate differing ideas is being regulated. In this sense, the
application of the fairness doctrine to editorial advertisements affects the broadcaster only in its role as guardian of the public forum.
The broadcaster's role as journalist would be curtailed if the FCC
were to impose a duty to broadcast all proposed editorials directed
to it." In Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, the Supreme Court decided that there was no
constitutional or statutory right of access to broadcast editorial announcements.2 Unlimited access to the airwaves would be unfair
and contrary to the public interest since only the affluent would be
able to afford to purchase air time to express their views. On the
other hand, if access were free, the FCC would be forced to regulate
further the time and manner of broadcasting the editorial announcements. The ultimate result of free access would be more
federal involvement in the broadcasting industry than is permitted
under the First Amendment or the public interest standard. 3 Therefore, licensees must retain their journalistic discretion to be able to
select those editorial announcements which they prefer to broadcast, subject only to the duty to provide access time to opposing
editorial viewpoints.
Another area where broadcasters must be concerned for the public
welfare and their own First Amendment rights is political advertisements. The public interest in the political process is greater than in
any other area of broadcaster programming. A licensee would be in
breach of its public trust as well as its journalistic duty if it totally
refrained from broadcasting political issues. The public interest in
political candidates and issues has prompted congressional legisla79. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 761-65 (1976).
80. Id. at 769-70.
81. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 118
(1973).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 120.
84. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1962 and 1978 Supp.); see note 87 infra.
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tion and agency regulation."5 The duties promulgated therein tend
to promote the public interest by requiring broadcasters to provide
media access to opposing candidates or their spokesmen."6 In effect,
broadcasters are under a general duty to promote the political welfare of the public.
POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENTS

The broadcaster's legislative duty is set forth in section 315 of the
Communications Act. 7 Under that provision, licensees must provide equal broadcast opportunities to all legally qualified candidates.88 However, this duty to provide equal opportunities does not
extend to candidate appearances on bona fide newscasts, news interviews, news documentaries or on-the-spot coverage of bona fide
news events. 9 Those candidate appearances are subject to the fairness doctrine. 0
The FCC has adopted a corollary to the equal opportunities legislation." This corollary provides that spokesmen for opposing candidates be given comparable air time to present their views on campaign issues after a broadcaster has sold air time to political supNicholas Zapple, 23 F.C.C.2d 707 (1970); see note 91 infra.
See notes 87, 91 infra.
(a) If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting
station: Provided, That such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the
material broadcast under the provisions of this section. No obligation is imposed
under the subsection upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such
candidate. Appearance by a legally qualified candidate on any(1) bona fide newscast,
(2) bona fide news interview,
(3) bona fide news documentary (if the appearance of the candidate is incidental
to the presentation of the subject or subjects covered by the news documentary),
or
(4) on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events (including but not limited to
political conventions and activities incidental thereto), shall not be deemed to be
use of a broadcasting station within the meaning of this subsection. Nothing in the
foregoing sentence shall be construed as relieving broadcasters, in connection with
the presentation of newscasts, news interviews, news documentaries, and on-thespot coverage of news events, from the obligation imposed upon them under this
chapter to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for
the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance.
47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1962 and 1978 Supp.).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. In Nicholas Zapple, 23 F.C.C.2d 707 (1970), the FCC held that broadcasters must
allow the political supporters of a campaigning candidate air time comparable to that sold
to supporters of an opposing candidate.
85.
86.
87.
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porters of one campaigning candidate." However, this duty to allow
quasi-equal opportunities does not extend to providing free broad3
cast time to supporters of opposing candidates.
The broadcaster as public trustee and political observer must
serve the public interest by permitting access to the airwaves for the
candidates and their spokesmen, thus functioning consistently with
the First Amendment purpose of encouraging an informed populace.' This FCC doctrine merely regulates when the broadcaster
must allow rebuttal time to political candidates and their spokesmen. It does not control the content of the broadcaster's programs
except to the extent that the broadcaster elects to provide air time
to a political candidate or his supporter. These duties infringe only
slightly on the broadcaster's journalistic discretion concerning programming content. Once it has exercised its discretion to sell air
time to particular candidates or spokesmen, then it is obligated to
provide equal or comparable time to legally recognized opponents.
The third category of advertisements, commercial, has caused
considerable confusion regarding the proper responsibility of the
broadcaster under the fairness doctrine. 5 This confusion arises because commercial advertising forms the economic foundation upon
which the broadcasting structure is built." The FCC must exercise
care when regulating this type of advertising so that it does not
undermine that foundation or abridge any rights of this form of
commercial speech. As the Commission is required to protect the
public interest, it must continually analyze commercial advertising
as a potential source of public harm, as well as program sponsorship.
COMMERCIAL ADVERTISEMENTS

In the early days of radio, commercial advertising was not within
the ambit of the fairness doctrine. The Federal Radio Commission
realized that advertising formed the economic base of the broadcasting system and that any regulation of it beyond volume and
character would unreasonably impair the industry's viability. 7
However, this position did not take into account that many commercial advertisements were potentially controversial. In 1967, the
92. Id.
93. Id. at 708-09; FCC Fairness Report, supra note 28 at 31. The broadcaster is also
required to give reasonable amounts of broadcast time to federal candidates if they cannot
afford it because the public interest in its federal officials is very great. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7)
(1978 Supp.).
94. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
95. FCC Fairness Report, supra note 28 at 24-25.
96. Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32 (1929).
97. Id. at 35.
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FCC decided that advertising controversial products, such as cigarettes, warranted application of the fairness doctrine. The FCC
found that cigarette advertisements presented an imbalanced image
of a controversial issue because they portrayed only the desirability
of the product and avoided any mention of potential health hazards."
In 1968, the District of Columbia Circuit in Banzhaf v. FCC upheld the FCC ruling which required the licensee to provide a
"significant amount of time for the other viewpoint,"'° even though
no positive statement concerning the desirability of smoking had
been made in the commercials. The court also held that this FCC
ruling did not violate the First Amendment since the advertisements constituted only marginal speech and the ruling would
achieve nothing more than a marginal "chill" of the licensee's freedom of speech. 0' Furthermore, the FCC ruling did not violate section 326 of the Communications Act because it did not supress any
information nor dictate the content of cigarette advertisements.,"
According to the FCC, the broadcaster had a duty to identify important public issues presented in commercials and offer reasonable
1
opportunities for rebuttal by responsible individuals. 03
Three years later in Friends of the Earth v. FCC, the District of
Columbia Circuit extended the FCC's interpretation of the fairness
doctrine to include standard product commercials.'0° The court
found that the health hazards created by air pollution from highpowered automobiles and leaded gasoline were analogous to those
caused by cigarette smoking.' 5 The fairness doctrine was triggered
because the automobile advertisements presented only one viewpoint of an existing health controversy.'10 Pursuant to the fairness
doctrine the broadcaster was to scrutinize all advertisements for
98. Television Station WCBS-TV, 8 F.C.C.2d 381 (1967), stay and reconsideration
denied, 9 F.C.C.2d 921 (1967).
99. 8 F.C.C.2d at 382; 9 F.C.C.2d at 938.
100. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Tobacco
Institute v. FCC, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
101. Id. at 1102.
102. Id. at 1103.
103. Television Station WCBS-TV, 9 F.C.C.2d at 942.
104. Friends of the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Earlier this court had
held that product advertisements by a department store while a boycott and union strike were
being staged against it implicitly raised the controversial issue of whether the store should
be patronized. Retail Store Employee Union, Local 880, R.I.C.A., v. FCC, 436 F.2d 248 (D.C.
Cir. 1970).
105. 449 F.2d at 1169. The Surgeon General's Report on "Motor Vehicles, Air Pollution
and Health" (1962) stated that automobile emissions presented significant dangers to human
health and survival.
106. 449 F.2d at 1170.
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controversial health issues.
The FCC subsequently asserted that its application of the fairness
doctrine to cigarette advertising was too mechanical and contrary
to the fairness doctrine.' °7 Under that approach, the doctrine would
be triggered whenever a potential health issue could be discovered
in a commercial, despite the lack of any affirmative discussion of
that issue.' 8 Moreover, the extension of this doctrine to all standard
product commercial advertisements raised the prospect of compelling broadcasters to provide free air time when paid sponsors for
opposing viewpoints were unavailable. The result of this extension
would be broadcaster subsidization of opponents financially unable
to present their own views. This result would be unfair to broadcasters and contrary to the public interest. Broadcasters would be hesitant to accept advertising which was more than commonplace.
The purpose of the fairness doctrine is to encourage an informed
public. Extension of the doctrine to product advertising unreasonably diverts the attention of the broadcasters from aiding the development of an informed public opinion.' 9 Consequently, the FCC
repudiated this approach and now requires the broadcast of opposing viewpoints only when commercial advertisements present controversial public issues in an "obvious and meaningful" manner."10
This new approach was upheld recently when a court refused to
extend the fairness doctrine to snowmobile advertisements."' Controversial issues relating to the use of snowmobiles were not
"obviously and meaningfully" presented."12 This new approach removes the implicit issue from the purview of the fairness doctrine.",
The broadcaster's duty is now less onerous in this area because
only obvious discussions of controversial issues will trigger the fairness doctrine."' As guardian of the public interest, the broadcaster
still has a duty to eliminate false, misleading and deceptive advertising where possible." 5 The broadcaster does not have to scrutinize
107. FCC Fairness Report, supra note 28 at 24.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 26.
110. Id. This is the same standard that applies when the broadcaster is identifying controversial issues of public importance. Id. at 13.
111. Public Interest Research Group v. FCC, 522 F.2d 1060, 1065 (1st Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 965 (1976).
112. Id.
113. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 567 F.2d 1095, 1104 (D.C. Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3740 (1978).
114. FCC Fairness Report, supra note 28 at 24.
115. In re Licensee Responsibility with respect to the Broadcast of False, Misleading or
Deceptive Advertising, 40 F.C.C. 125, 126 (1961). Specifically, licensees must exercise due
care upon receipt of "Advertising Alerts" issued by the FTC concerning advertisements
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all advertisements for implied public controversies. Accordingly the
free flow of commercial information remains relatively unobstructed."'
PRIME TIME ACCESS RULE

Another area where the FCC is concerned with the free flow of
information is local programming during prime time. The FCC promulgated the prime time access rule (PTAR)"7 in order to diversify
programming sources. The Commission found that licensee responsibility for programming content had become almost completely
absorbed by the networks." 8 Programming content is one of the
primary responsibilities of the broadcast licensee"' and delegation
of this responsibility is a breach of the public trust. 20 Therefore, the
FCC sought to re-emphasize the duties owed the public regarding
programming content, 2 recognizing that regulation of the content
of prime time programming would encroach more directly on broadcaster speech.
The original rule (PTAR I) promulgated by the FCC stated that
television stations in the top 50 television markets, with three or
more commercial television stations, could not broadcast network
programs for more than three hours a day between the hours of 7:00
P.M. and 11:00 P.M. in the Eastern and Pacific Time Zones, and
between 6:00 P.M. and 10:00 P.M. in the Central and Mountain
Time Zones.22 This rule cleared one hour of television prime time
for local programming. PTAR I was upheld by the Second Circuit
as a reasonable exercise of FCC authority.'2 The court also stated
that PTAR I was not a direct restraint on speech since the licensee
has no absolute right to broadcast whatever it chooses. It is directed
by the Communications Act to subordinate its private interests to
the public's interests.'12
subject to FTC corrective action. The FTC has paramount authority concerning the public
interest in the area of false, misleading and deceptive advertising.
116. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 765 (1976).
117. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658 (k) (1970).
118. In the Matter of Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
with respect to Competition and Responsibility in Network Television Broadcasting, 23
F.C.C.2d 382, 394-95 (1970).
119. FCC 1960 En Banc Report, supra note 20 at 2313-14.
120. Massachusetts Universalist Convention v. Hildreth & Rogers Co., 183 F.2d 497, 500
(1st Cir. 1950).
121. In re Licensee Responsibility to Review Records before their Broadcast, 28 F.C.C.2d
409 (1971).
122. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k) (1970).
123. Mount Mansfield Television, Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1971).
124. Id. at 477-78.
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After subsequent amendment,2 5 PTAR III was adopted by the
FCC. 2 1 The one-hour access requirement was retained with several
125. Consideration of the Operation of, and Possible Changes in the "Prime Time Access
Rules" § 73.658(k) of Commission's Rules, 44 F.C.C.2d 1081 (1974) amended PTAR I by
reducing the access time to one-half hour. That rule became PTAR II. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k)
(1974). PTAR II was amended to reinstate the one-hour access time of PTAR I with the
addition of several exemptions. Consideration of the Operation of, and Possible Changes in
the "Prime Time Access Rules" § 73.658(k) of Commission's Rules, 50 F.C.C.2d 829 (1975).
126. (k) Effective September 8, 1975, television stations owned by or affiliated
with a national television network in the 50 largest television markets (see NOTE
1 to this paragraph) shall devote, during the four hours of prime time (7-11 p.m.
E.T. and P.T., 6-10 p.m. C.T. and M.T.), no more than three hours to the presentation of programs from a national network, programs formerly on a national network
(off-network programs) or feature films which have previously appeared on a network: provided, however, That the following categories of programs need not be
counted toward the three-hour limitation:
(1) Network or off-network programs designed for children, public affairs programs or documentary programs (see NOTE 2 to this paragraph for definitions).
(2) Special news programs dealing with fast-breaking news events, on-the-spot
coverage of news events or other material related to such coverage, and political
broadcasts by or on behalf of legally qualified candidates for public office.
(3) Regular network broadcasts up to a half-hour, when immediately adjacent to
a full hour of continuous locally produced news or locally produced public affairs
programming.
(4) Runovers of live network broadcasts of sporting events, where the event has
been reasonably scheduled to conclude before prime time or occupy only a certain
dmount of prime time, but the event has gone beyond its expected duration due to
circumstances not reasonably foreseeable by the networks or under their control.
This exemption does not apply to postgame material.
(5) In the case of stations in the Mountain and Pacific time zones, on evenings
when network prime time programming consists of a sports event or other program
broadcast live and simultaneously throughout the contiguous 48 states, such stations may assume that the network's schedule that evening occupies no more of
prime time in these time zones that it does in the Eastern and Central time zones.
(6) Network broadcasts of an international sports event (such as the Olympic
Games), New Year's Day college football games, or any other network programming
of a special nature other than motion pictures or other sports events, when the
network devotes all of its time on the same evening to the same programming,
except brief incidental fill material.
NOTE .- The top 50 markets to which this paragraph applies on the 50 largest
markets in terms of prime time audience for all stations in the market, as listed
each year in the Arbitron publication Television Market Analysis. This publication
is currently issued each November, and shortly thereafter the Commission will issue
a list of markets to which the rule will apply for the year starting the following
September.
NOTE 2.-As used in this paragraph the term "programs designed for children"
means programs primarily designed for children aged 2 through 12. The term
"documentary programs" means programs which are non-fictional and educational
or informational, but not including programs where the information is used as part
of a contest among participants in the program, and not including programs relating to the visual entertainment arts (stage, motion pictures or television) where
more than 50% of the program is devoted to the presentation of entertainment
material itself.
47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k) (1977).
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exemptions, which classified certain network programs that could
be broadcast in the one-hour cleared access time. 27 The Second
Circuit upheld PTAR III on grounds similar to those relied upon in
the PTAR I case and found the exemptions not arbitrary or capricious.'28 The exemptions comprised categories of program for which
the FCC had been routinely granting waivers from the application

of PTAR

1.129

Under PTAR III, broadcasters will increasingly rely on local
sources despite their desire to program only network shows. When
local sources are unavailable, broadcasters will have the option of
programming network material which falls within one of the exemptions. It is clear that public benefit from this rule will outweigh
harm to the broadcaster. The public will have greater opportunities
for receiving programs of concern to the local community. The
broadcaster, as a fiduciary, must respond to the public interest in
local activities, even to the extent of curtailing its programming
discretion.
Overall, licensee responsibility has been expanded under the public interest standard and the fairness doctrine to include access time
for community programming,13° coverage of opposing viewpoints on
important public issues, 3' reasonable opportunities to respond to
personal attacks, 32 and political editorials.'3 In the sphere of advertising, a broadcaster's duty now includes presenting contrary viewpoints of controversial issues obviously presented in commercial
advertisements 34 and providing comparable broadcast time to
spokesmen of campaigning candidates.'1Expansion of licensee responsibility in the area of programming content has been proposed.
The public's interest in the welfare of children may require programming of violent, indecent and sexually-oriented material at
times beyond the access of children. 3 ' Affirmative action in this
area is thus far limited to the adoption by the broadcast industry
of a "Family Viewing" period. 37 This proposed expansion, more
than the other actual duties, would highlight the existing conflict
127. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k)(1) (1977).
128. National Ass'n. of Independent Television Producers and Distrib. v. FCC, 516 F.2d
526, 537-39 (2d Cir. 1975).
129. Id. at 541-42. The court did find the no feature film rule arbitrary. Id. at 543.
130. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k) (1977).
131. FCC Fairness Report, supra note 28 at 7.
132. See note 45 supra.
133. See note 55 supra.
134. FCC Fairness Report, supra note 28 at 23.
135. Nicholas Zapple, 23 F.C.C.2d 707 (1970).
136. FCC Violence and Obscenity Report, supra note 8 at 422.
137. National Ass'n. of Broadcasters, Television Code, art. I, para. 8 (19th ed. 1976).
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between the broadcasters' First Amendment rights and the FCC's
authority.
FAMILY VIEWING PERIOD

Under the industry's guidelines, the "Family Viewing" period
would consist of the first hour of prime time network entertainment
programming and the hour immediately preceding it.' 3 During that

time, the broadcaster would make reasonable efforts to see that its
broadcast material is appropriate for the entire family.'39 Viewer
advisories would be visually and aurally broadcast to alert parents
that a program during this period may be unsuitable for children." 0
Pursuant to these guidelines, the broadcaster would be required to
notify publishers of television listings about programs containing
these advisories. 141
The FCC's campaign for these guidelines resulted from a tremendous increase in the volume of complaints relating to violence and
obscenity.' In 1972, the Surgeon General's report on the impact of
televised violence concluded that televised violence can induce imitation by children' and may promote an increase in aggression."'
The Surgeon General's Committee cautioned that these findings do
not support the conclusion that televised violence adversely affects
the majority of children.'45 The National Commission on Causes and
Prevention of Violence, in its Final Report,"' stated that a
"constant diet of violent behavior" is harmful to the human character,'47 and that televised violence encourages violence in real life and
138. Id.; FCC Violence and Obscenity Report, supra note 8 at 422. This period would be
from 7 p.m. to 9 p.m. Eastern time Monday through Saturday. Network programming could
begin one-half hour earlier on Sunday.
139. Id.
140. Id. Also, viewer advisories were suggested for later evening programs where the
contents might be disturbing to a great number of the viewing public.
141. Id.
142. FCC Violence and Obscenity Report, supra note 8 at 418-19. In 1972, approximately
2000 complaints were received by the FCC whereas in 1974, almost 25,000 complaints were
received.
143. SURGEON GENERAL'S SCIENTIFIC ADVISORS COMMITTEE ON TELEVISION AND VIOLENCE,
TELEVISION AND GROWING UP: THE IMPACT OF TELEVISED VIOLENCE 12 (1972).

144. Id.
145. Id. The Committee's studies did indicate that violence on television may cause
increased aggressiveness in some children, but the size of those groups of children is presently
unknown due to the insufficiency of the available data. Id. at Vol. 1, 12. See also The
Regulation of Televised Violence, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1291 (1974) for an in-depth discussion of
the reports and effects of televised violence.
146. NATIONAL COMM'N ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, To ESTABLISH JUSTICE,
TO INSURE DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY, FINAL REPORT (1969).

147.

Id. at ch. 8, 199.
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may desensitize viewers.'48 The FCC has declared that broadcasters
have a special duty to children, and in implementing that duty
should design programs to meet their special needs. "9 As public
trustees, broadcast licensees are responsible for creating programs
which are in the children's best interests.' 5 Providing diversified
children's programming is one means by which licensees can fulfill
their duties.
In 1975, the FCC issued its "Report on the Broadcast of Violent,
Indecent and Obscene Material," 5 ' which discussed the appropriate
steps which may be taken to prohibit indecent or obscene material
on television and to protect children from violent or sexuallyoriented material.'52 The broadcast of obscene and indecent lan5 3 and the
guage is prohibited'
FCC is authorized to enforce that
provision. ' "
In an effort to eliminate indecent language more effectively from
the airwaves, the FCC re-defined "indecent" language to include a
nuisance principle, channelling highly suggestive films to later time
slots rather than prohibiting them.' 5 As re-defined, indecent language is "patently offensive" language, which must not be broadcast at times when there is a reasonable possibility that children are
present in the listening audience.' 6 The FCC definition was recently
148. Id. at 198-99. In the televised trial of Ronney Zamora in Florida, the defendant
Zamora alleged as his defense that he was "intoxicated" by televised violence. See also 2 more
teens seized in 'TV' car theft case, Chicago Tribune, August 1, 1978, at 12, columns 1 and 2,
where teenagers alleged that knowledge of a scheme to steal cars came from a television
program.
149. Children's Television Report and Policy Statement, 50 F.C.C.2d 1, 5 (1974). The
impact of television upon children has been a primary concern of Action for Children's
Television (ACT), a non-profit organization which is seeking to improve children's programming. This organization spurred the FCC into inquiring into children's programs and commercial advertising during those programs.
150. Id. Although the FCC did not adopt ACT's proposals, it did remind broadcasters of
their duties to provide diversified programming for pre-school children and to eliminate
"host-selling" and to avoid over-commercialization. It did point out that broadcasters will
have to separate advertising from programming and to eliminate advertising practices which
take advantage of children. Id. at 18.
151. FCC Violence and Obscenity Report, supra note 8 at 418.
152. Id. at 419.
153. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1966) provides that:
Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio
communication shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than
two years, or both.
154. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (b), 503 (b)(1)(e) (1978 Supp.) respectively provide that the FCC
can revoke a license, issue a cease and desist order or impose a monetary forfeiture for
violation of that provision.
155. In the Matter of Citizen's Complaint against Pacifica Foundation, Station WBAI
(FM), 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98 (1975).
156. Id.
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upheld by the Supreme Court in FCC v. PacificaFoundation.5 7 The
Court held that section 326 of the Communications Act,5 8 the nocensorship provision, does not prevent the FCC from imposing sanctions upon licensees who violate section 1464 by broadcasting obscene, indecent or profane language. 5 ' The First Amendment does
not prohibit all government regulation of speech,6 0 since there are
times when speech may be regulated' or prohibited' by governmental entities. Where children's interests are involved, more regulation may be deemed necessary.'
Regulation of the content of television programming is a sensitive
area. The First Amendment and section 326 provide little room for
regulatory action in this area.'64 The FCC deems self-regulation by
broadcast licensees more desirable than governmental regulation.'"
Although it recognizes that more controls may be necessary for
broadcasts affecting children, 66 the FCC is unwilling to become
involved in censorship controversies.6 7 Nevertheless, the FCC has
been willing to regulate the time, place and manner of broadcasting
indecent language,6 " but unwilling to regulate the same factors concerning the televising of violent and sexually-oriented programs.'
Nonetheless, the FCC has approved the broadcast industry's
guidelines for a "Family Viewing" period 70 because the restriction
of certain viewing time to general family audiences does not prohibit
diverse adult programming. The guidelines merely postpone that
157. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 46 U.S.L.W. 5018 (1978).
158. Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the Commission the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or
fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by
means of radio communication.
47 U.S.C. § 326 (1962).
159. 46 U.S.L.W. at 5021.
160. Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
161. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476 (1956).
162. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), which set forth the incitement
to violence exception to the First Amendment.
163. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Paris Adult Theater v. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49 (1973); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
164. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part:
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. . .. "U.S.
CONST. amend. I; 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1962), supra note 158.
165. FCC Violence and Obscenity Report, supra note 8 at 420.
166. In the Matter of Citizen's Complaint against Pacifica Foundation, Station WBAI
(FM), 56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975).
167. FCC Violence and Obscenity Report, supra note 8 at 420.
168. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 46 U.S.L.W. 5018 (1978).
169. FCC Violence and Obscenity Report, supra note 8 at 420-24.
170. Id. at 422.
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type of programming to later time slots.' 7 ' A California district court
recently held that neither the FCC nor the National Association of
Broadcasters (NAB) could pressure individual broadcast licensees
into adopting the "Family Viewing" guidelines. 72 The court asserted that adoption of those guidelines by broadcasters using
their independent discretion would be permissible.' It should be
noted that FCC involvement was not countenanced because proper
administrative procedures were not followed by the FCC in establishing the family viewing policy.'74 This case can be contrasted with
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, the "filthy words" case,' where the
Supreme Court permitted regulation of the time and manner of
broadcasting indecent material since the FCC had followed the proper procedures.'76 Therefore, it appears that the family viewing period could be formally adopted by the FCC if the proper procedures
were followed, because such regulation would control only the time,
place and manner of broadcasting and not the contents of the broadcasts.' In following the family viewing policy, the broadcaster
would be serving the public interest by scheduling programs for
various age groups at appropriate times. By enforcing this policy,
the FCC would be upholding the public interest while not infringing
the broadcaster's free speech because it would be regulating constitutionally permissible factors.
BREACH OF

PUBLIC

TRUST-TORT LIAiuTY

The broadcast licensee has a duty to broadcast in the public
interest, 7 8 and when it fails to do so it breaches that duty.'79 In the
traditional sense, a breach of this public trust usually occurs when
the licensee uses its facilities to promote its own private interests,1' s
when it delegates its programming responsibilities to others,'8 ' when
171. Id.at 423.
172. Writers Guild of America West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1094 (C.D. Cal.
1976).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1073; See Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1977) for the proper
administrative procedures.
175. 46 U.S.L.W. 5018 (1978).
176. Id.at 5023-24.
177. See Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); and Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77 (1949).
178. Public Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees, supra note 15; KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n, Inc. v. FRC, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
179. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C.
Cir. 1966); Massachusetts Universalist Convention v. Hildreth & Rogers Co., 183 F.2d 497
(1st Cir. 1950).
180. 47 F.2d at 672.
181. 183 F.2d at 500.
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it unreasonably, arbitrarily or in bad faith exercises its discretion
under the fairness doctrine 8 2 or when it refuses to allow reply time
pursuant to the personal attack rule. 13 Violations of the foregoing
duties usually result in some type of FCC sanction. Where the
breach is particularly egregious, the Commission may refuse to
renew' 8 or even revoke'8 the broadcaster's license. The FCC also
has the authority to issue cease and desist orders,' assess forfeitures and penalities,"17 and order any other appropriate sanction.' U
Although the parameters of FCC remedial authority are set, the
boundaries of the public interest standard, which bind both the
FCC and broadcasters, are flexible. A trend towards increasing licensee responsibility and liability is discernible from the promulgation of additional broadcast regulations, 8' the extension of the fairness doctrine,"90 and the development of case law."'1
A recent development in communications law is the imposition of
tort damages. In Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., a radio broadcast
licensee was found negligent in broadcasting a promotional scheme
which caused teenagers to drive recklessly and kill a motorist."12 The
jury had found that the actions of the teenagers, who had followed
a travelling disc jockey to win a promotional prize, were foreseeable
by the licensee."13 The California Supreme Court held that the radio
station, as the creator of the unreasonable risk of harm to the deceased motorist, was liable for its negligent use of language." 4 The
time, place and manner of the radio broadcaster's speech were
stressed by the court as a basis for the finding of foreseeability." 5
This court dismissed the radio broadcaster's First Amendment
defense by stating that the real issue in the case was ". . . civil

accountability for the foreseeable results of a broadcast which created an undue risk of harm to the decedent. The First Amendment
does not sanction the infliction of physical injury merely because
182. Neckritz v. FCC, 502 F.2d 411, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
183. Straus Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 530 F.2d 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
184. 47 F.2d at 672.
185. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (1962 and 1978 Supp.).
186. 47 U.S.C. § 312(b) (1962 and 1978 Supp.).
187. 47 U.S.C. §§ 502, 503(b) (1962 and 1978 Supp.).
188. 47 U.S.C. § 312 (1962 and 1978 Supp.).
189. See notes 45, 55, 126, supra, and accompanying text.
190. See notes 5, 91, supra, and accompanying text.
191. Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468, 539 P.2d 36 (1975);
Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Co., 74 Cal. App. 3d 383, 141 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1977).
192. 15 Cal. 3d 40, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468, 539 P.2d 36 (1975).
193. Id. at 47, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 472, 539 P.2d at 40.
194. Id.at 47-48, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 472, 539 P.2d at 40-41.
195. Id. at 46, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 477, 539 P.2d at 39.
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achieved by word, rather than by act."'96
Liability has also been imposed where a broadcaster deprived an
entertainer of his livelihood.'9 In a recent Supreme Court case, a
television broadcaster was held liable for televising in its entirety an
entertainer's "human cannonball" act without his consent. 98 State
law provided for a "right to the publicity value of [a] performance."199 The Court held that neither the First nor the Fourteenth
Amendments immunized a television broadcaster from liability for
infringing the individual's right to compensation. 00 The performer
did not seek to censor the televised broadcast; he merely sought
compensatory damages for loss of part of his livelihood.20 ' Publicizing the fact of the human cannonball act was well within the licensee's exercise of programming discretion and within the public interest. Broadcasting the performance in the chosen manner infringed the plaintiff's right to compensation for his work.
Olivia N. v. NationalBroadcastingCompany represents the most
controversial extension of a licensee's duty of care. 22 In that case, a
California appellate court held that a minor plaintiff who had been
"artificially raped" had a right to a jury trial on the question of the
wilfulness and negligence of a television licensee and network in
broadcasting (during the early evening hours) a movie containing a
very violent scene. 3 Four days after the depiction of the "artificial
rape" scene in the film "Born Innocent", an eight-year-old girl was
"artifically raped" by four adolescent girls who had seen the movie
and decided to imitate the rape scene. 20 ' As the California court
noted, the First Amendment generally applies to television broadcasts,205 but its protection does not extend to all speech. It has been
196. Id. at 48, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 472, 539 P.2d at 40.
197. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
198. Id. at 578.
199. Id. at 565.
200. Id. at 575.
201. Id. at 578.
202. 74 Cal. App. 3d 383, 141 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1977). The Supreme Court denied certiorari
on April 25, 1978. National Broadcasting Co. v. Niemi, 46 U.S.L.W. 3665 (1978). The case
subsequently went to trial at the end of July, 1978. The trial court dismissed the case because
plaintiff's attorney refused to present evidence on the "incitement to violence" exception to
the First Amendment.

203.

Id.

204. Olivia N's Reply to NBC's Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, October Term, 1977, No. 77-1308 at 5. According to Respondent's brief, girls
who were sent to a juvenile home in Tacoma, Washington, were being "artifically raped" in
an initiation rite by inmates there for over a year after the telecast of this movie. Id. at 5.
205. 74 Cal. App. 3d at 387, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 513. See also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367
(1969).
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Broadcaster Responsibility

held that areas of unprotected speech include "libel, slander, misrepresentation, obscenity, perjury, false advertising, solicitation of
crime, complicity by encouragement, conspiracy, and the like."' '
Speech which incites unlawful action is also not protected by the
First Amendment.
As noted earlier, broadcast licensees are under a fiduciary duty
to the public to broadcast in their interest.2 18 The First Amendment
does not grant broadcasters a license to inflict physical injuries by
their words.2 09 Moreover, the First Amendment does not insulate
broadcasters from tort liability. 210 In the future, tort damages may
be the type of relief awarded where failure to program material
particularly stimulating to children in a proper time slot results in
a child's physical and psychological injury."' It was contended in
the "artificial rape" case that there was a substantial likelihood that
impressionable children stimulated by the program would imitate
its violent rape scene. 12 Various studies conducted indicate that
televised violence does have a great impact on children.213 In contrast with the probability of great harm to children who watch violent films, the licensees and networks who broadcast them have a
relatively slight burden of rescheduling. This rescheduling would
not inhibit or chill broadcaster First Amendment rights since the
rescheduling would only affect the time, place and manner of presenting these films and not their total prohibition. 21 In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, the Supreme Court held that the FCC could sanction a radio station for broadcasting indecent language during the
hours when children were most likely to be in the audience. 15 The
same rationale should apply when a court is seeking to assess tort
damages against a broadcaster for injuries sustained because of a
206. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Calif., 366 U.S. 36, 49 n.10 (1961). See, e.g., Leflar, The
Free-ness of Free Speech, 15 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1073, 1075-76 (1962).
207. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969). In a Harvard Law Review article,
Mr. Justice Brennan noted that "speech itself [may] be under the first amendment, [but]
the manner of its exercise or its collateral aspects may fall beyond the scope of the amendment." Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First
Amendment, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1, 5 (Nov. 1965).
208. See note 15 supra.
209. Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468, 539 P.2d 36 (1975).
210. Id.
211. Id.; Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Co., 74 Cal. App. 3d 383, 141 Cal. Rptr. 511
(1977).
212. 74 Cal. App. 3d 383, 141 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1977).
213. See notes 143-48 supra.
214. Compare Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), and Adderley
v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966), with Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) and
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
215. 46 U.S.L.W. 5018 (1978).
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broadcast of a violent film during the family viewing time."'
The foregoing cases point out the necessiity of regulating the time,
place and manner of broadcasting. As long as no attempt is made
to censor the content of the programs broadcasted, regulation of this
nature should be upheld.
The crucial problem in this area is the scope of regulation of the
time and manner of broadcasting certain programs. Although the
FCC maintains that the licensee retains its programming discretion,
that agency is the entity that ultimately decides whether the licensee's programming benefits the public interest.
The licensee's interest in its freedom of speech may clash more
directly with the FCC interest in the public welfare when the family
viewing policy is formally adopted. Because children will be particularly involved in the implementation of this policy, the FCC may
deem itself obligated to infringe the broadcaster's rights to some
extent. Where the burden on the broadcaster is as slight as rescheduling, the broadcaster may find that the FCC as well as the courts
will permit some encroachment on its freedom of speech in pursuit
of public interest.
CONCLUSION

Public interest remains the test against which actions of broadcast licensees are measured. That test has been broadly stated but
refined by FCC policy statements, reports and regulations, as well
as by case law. The public has First Amendment rights which are
paramount to those of broadcasters. Government regulations have
thus far tended to promote the public's exercise of free speech without greatly infringing similar rights of broadcasters. Broadcasters
are realizing that the public interest involves more than merely
broadcasting the news, music and sports. Broadcast licensees are
caretakers of the public forum, and as such have a constantly changing duty of care to the public. This change is manifested in the
expansion of responsibilities imposed on broadcasters, from local
programming of community affairs to redress for negligent broadcasting. This expansion can be justified as the natural growth of the
public interest. In serving that interest, broadcasters must be willing at times to sacrifice their interests in order to preserve the public's interest.
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